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Guasco: Limited Remand in Sentencing Hearings

NOTE
DEFINING "ORDINARY PRUDENTIAL
DOCTRINES" AFTER BOOKER:
WHY THE LIMITED REMAND IS THE
LEAST OF MANY EVILS
INTRODUCTION

In 1984, Congress created the Sentencing Guidelines to help prevent
disparity in sentencing. I The Guidelines were supposed to narrow the
discretion that sentencing judges exercised, in order to make sentences
more uniform. 2 In United States v. Booker, however, the United States
Supreme Court declared that the way in which federal criminal
defendants had been sentenced for nearly twenty years was
unconstitutional. 3 The Court stated that the Sixth Amendment right to
trial by jury applies to the Sentencing Guidelines. 4 The Court went on to
state that, in cases that were on direct review at the time of the decision,
"ordinary prudential doctrines" would govern sentences that were
suddenly unconstitutional. 5
Following the Court's attempt at clarification in Booker, a new

I See Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United States Sentencing
Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and Effective Sentencing
System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 185, 188-189 (1993). Senator Hatch was one of the primary
drafters of the law that created the Sentencing Guidelines. Id.
2 1d.
3 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226-227 (2005) (Stevens, J., for the Court in
part).
4 See id.
S See id. at 268 (Breyer, J., for the Court in part).
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disparity has emerged. 6 The various circuits have adopted four different
interpretations of what the Court meant by "ordinary prudential
doctrines.,,7 The one clear fact that has emerged is that defendants are
being treated differently based solely on where they committed their
crimes, 8 exactly the type of disparity that Congress was trying to avoid
when it created the Sentencing Guidelines. 9 The Solicitor General has
urged the Supreme Court to address this disparity.1O However, to date
the Supreme Court has declined to do so. 11
The Ninth Circuit decided to use Alfred Ameline's case as its
vehicle for choosing what approach it would take when a defendant had
not preserved Booker error. 12 Ameline's case had already taken an
extended tour through the federal courts. Ameline pled guilty to selling
methamphetarnines and was sentenced in 2002, before Booker was
decided. 13 However, while his case was on direct review, the Supreme
Court decided, in Blakely v. Washington, that Washington's sentencing
scheme was unconstitutional. 14 In light of Blakely, Ameline's appellate
panel sua sponte raised the issue of whether the Sentencing Guidelines
violated the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. 15 The panel held
that the Guidelines did violate the Sixth Amendment and remanded his
case for a new sentencing hearing. 16
Ameline filed a petition for rehearing. 17 While that petition was
pending, the Supreme Court decided, in United States v. Booker, that the
Sentencing Guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment right to trial by
jury. 18 The original panel, noting that Ameline had not raised a Sixth
6 Peter A. Jenkins, Requiring the Unknown or Preserving Reason: United States v.
Gonzalez-Huerta and the Tenth Circuit's Compromise Approach to Booker Error, 83 DENY. U. L.
REv. 815 (2006).
7 The four approaches, which will be discussed in detail infra, are (1) the hard-line
approach, (2) the presumption-of-prejudice approach, (3) the "compromise" approach, and (4) the
limited-remand approach.
8 See Jenkins, supra note 6, at 815.
9 See Hatch, supra note I, at 188-189.
10 See Brief of the United States, Rodriguez v. United States, 545 U.S. 1127 (2005) (No. 041148) 2005 WL 1210522 at *7.
II See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 545 U.S. 1127 (2005) (denying cert.).
12 See United States v. Ameline, 401 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2005) (order granting rehearing en
banc). Booker error occurred whenever a defendant was sentenced under the mandatory Sentencing
Guidelines. See United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1077-1078 (9th Cir. 2005) [Ameline II1J.
13 United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967, 970-971 (9th Cir. 2003) [Ameline IJ.
14 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305 (2004).
IS Ameline I, 376 F.3d at 971.
16 Id. at 984.
17 United States v. Ameline, 400 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 2004) [Ameline II].
18 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,226-227 (2005) (Stevens, J., for the Court in part).
The history and use of the Sentencing Guidelines are discussed infra at notes 27-52 and
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Amendment challenge, held that the sentence amounted to plain error
and again remanded for resentencing. 19 The Ninth Circuit then took the
case en banc to decide what procedure would be used for defendants
raising unpreserved Booker error. 20 The en banc panel adopted the
"limited-remand" approach. 21
This Note examines the limited-remand approach in comparison
with the approaches taken by the different circuits. Part I discusses the
history of the Sentencing Guidelines and the cases, up to and including
Booker, that completely changed the way the Sentencing Guidelines
were used. 22 Part II sets forth the history of the traditional plain error
standard of review and the contemporary "Plain Error Problem.,,23 Part
III examines the limited-remand approach and compares it with the
approach taken in other circuits. 24 Part IV argues that the limited-remand
approach is the best of a list of bad possible choices but that the Ninth
Circuit should have imposed a higher burden of proof on defendants
before they could obtain a limited remand. 25 Finally, Part V concludes
that although it alters the traditional plain-error standard of review, the
limited-remand approach is the most consistent with the intent of the
majority that authored the remedial portion of the Booker opinion but
would be improved with a higher burden on defendants. 26
I.

BACKGROUND

From the late nineteenth century until 1984, most federal crimes
were sentenced based upon an indeterminate sentencing scheme. 27
Under an indeterminate sentencing scheme, Congress simply set a range
of sentences for each crime and left the particular sentence to the
discretion of the sentencing judge. 28 Congress had the authority to
legislate a determinate sentence for each particular crime. 29 However,

accompanying text, as are the cases that led to Booker at notes 53-116 and accompanying text
19 Ameline II, 400 F.3d at 649-650.
20 United States v. Ameline, 401 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2005) (order granting rehearing en
banc).
21 United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1074 (9th Cir. 2005) (en bane) [Ameline III].
22 See infra notes 27 -134 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 135-155 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 156-191 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 192-246 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 247 -252 and accompanying text.
27 See Hatch, supra note I, at 186.
28 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989).
29 [d. at 364 (citing United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820) ("Congress, of
course, has the power to fix the sentence for a federal crime ....

"».

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2007

3

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 7

612

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

Congress generally gave the sentencing judge the discretion to choose
the particular sentence from within a range of sentences. 30 Courts soon
recognized that a sentence under such a scheme was virtually free from
any form of appellate review. 31
A.

32

SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1984

For several years, Congress was concerned with the "intolerable
disparities that plagued the indeterminate federal sentencing system. ,,33
In 1958, Congress responded to the noted disparities by establishing a
sentencing institute and advisory council to make advisory criteria for
sentencing. 34 The purpose of these voluntary measures was to encourage
"[f1ederal judges [to] reach a desirable degree of consensus as to the
types of sentences which should be implemented in different kinds of
cases.,,35 However, this seemed to have little effect. 36
Several studies demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the advisory
criteria. 37 One such study reported that "the range of average sentences

30 See, e.g., United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1978) (noting that early in
America's history each crime had a fixed sentence, which changed to providing a range of sentences
for each crime).
31 See, e.g., Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 440-41 (1974) (stating that the firmly
established rule was that appellate courts lacked control over any sentence that was within the
statutory range).
32 The full legislative history of the Sentencing Reform Act is beyond the scope of this Note.
For a thorough, though overly critical, examination of the legislative history of the act, see Kate Stith
& Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223 (1993).
33 Brief for Senators Hatch, Kennedy and Feinstein as Amici Curiae, United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2003) (Nos 04-104, 04-105), 2004 WL 1950640 at *6. As mentioned supra,
Sen. Hatch was one of the key drafters of the law that created the Sentencing Guidelines. See Hatch,
supra note I. Sen. Kennedy was the other primary drafter of the law. See id. Under the
indeterminate sentencing system, each crime had a range of sentences from which the sentencing
judge could choose. For example, a crime might have had a sentence of six to sixteen years in
prison. See id. The judge was given no guidance beyond that range and was free to choose from
anywhere in that range. See id. The problem was an extreme lack of consistency. See id. One
defendant could receive the six years in prison from a "lenient" judge, while someone who
committed the same crime in the same manner, and who had the same criminal history, could receive
sixteen years from a "tough" judge. See id.
34 28 U.S.C.A § 334(a) (West 2007).
35 S. REp. No. 85-2013, at 3 (1958)
36 See Brief for Senators Hatch, Kennedy and Feinstein, supra note 33, at *9 (citing Marvin
Frankel, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5, 66 (1972). Federal Judge Frankelconsidered a leading authority on federal sentencing-said that "the sentencing institute is almost
irrelevant" and that the disparities under the indeterminate sentencing scheme were "terrifying and
intolerable for a society that professes devotion to the rule oflaw." See id at 5, 66.
37 S. REp. No. 98-225 at 44 n.l45 (1983) (listing some of the studies that were presented to
Congress).
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for forgery [ran] from thirty months in the Third Circuit to eighty-two
months in the District of Columbia. ,,38 The trend was noted in several
other studies that Congress identified as part of a set of hearings. 39 Even
worse, the trend indicated that several judges were considering factors
that were inappropriate or even illegal to consider, such as race and
gender. 40 In response, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 ("SRA,,).41 The SRA was the product of nearly a decade of work in
the House and Senate to overhaul the federal sentencing scheme. 42
The cornerstone of the SRA was the creation of a sentencing
guidelines system. 43 The act created the independent Sentencing
Commission. 44 The primary role of the Sentencing Commission was to
establish a set of guidelines to be used during sentencing by district
judges. 45 The Sentencing Guidelines were supposed to further the
objectives of the SRA. 46 The objectives of sentencing as announced in
the SRA were
(1) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect

for the law, and to provide just punishment; (2) to afford
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (3) to protect the
public from further crimes of the defendant; and (4) to provide
the defendant with educational or vocational training, medical
care, or other correctional treatment. 47
One area of debate was whether the Guidelines would be mandatory
or advisory.48 Under the House of Representatives' version of the bill,

38 S. REp. No. 98-225 at 41 n.l43 (1983) (quoting Whitney N. Seymour, 1972 Sentencing
Study for the Southern District of New York, 45 N.Y.S. B.J. 163, 167 (1973».
39 S. REP. No. 98-225 at 44 (1983).
40 See Brief for Senators Hatch, Kennedy and Feinstein, supra note 33, at *11 (citing
REFORM OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL
LAWS AND PROCEDURES OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
PT. 13,9047 (1977) (Testimony of Prof. Alan Dershowitz); H.R. REp. No. 98-1017 at 102 (1983)).
41 See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, PuB. L. No. 98-473, 98 STAT. 1987 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.c. §§ 3551-3559,3561-3566,3571-3574,3581-3586, & 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998
(1988». The SRA was part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. See also Brief for
Senators Hatch, Kennedy and Feinstein, supra note 33, at *12.
42 S. REp. No. 98-225 at 37 (1983).
43 S. REp. No. 98-225 at 51-52 (1983).
44 28 U.S.C.A. § 991(a) (West 2007).
45 S. REP. No. 98-225 at 54 (1983).
46 See Hatch, supra note 1, at 188-189.
47 See id., at 188.
48 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 294 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing H.R. 6012, 98th CONG., 2D SESS. (1983».
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the Guidelines were merely advisory.49 However, under the Senate's
version, the Guidelines were mandatory.5o Several senators expressed
their desire to keep the Guidelines mandatory.51 As a result of a
compromise between the House and the Senate, the Guidelines were
made mandatory on district courts, and courts of appeals were granted
explicit authority to review sentences and remand for resentencing if
necessary. 52

B.

THE JONES, ApPRENDI, RING, AND BLAKELY CASES CAST DOUBT ON
THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES

Beginning in 1999, the Supreme Court began issuing decisions that
cast doubt on judicial factfinding. 53 While only one of the cases actually
involved the federal criminal system,54 these cases led to the question
whether the Sentencing Guidelines were constitutional. 55

1.

Jones v. United States

In Jones v. United States,56 the Court interpreted the federal
carjacking statute. 57 According to the statute, if a carjacking resulted in
serious bodily harm or in death, the sentence was increased. 58 This
additional fact was determined by the judge and was viewed as a
"sentencing factor" by the lower courtS. 59 In a five-to-four decision, the

49 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 294 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
H.R. 6012, 98th CONG., 2D SESS. (1983».
50 S. REP. No. 98-225 at 79 (1983) (stating that the Senate Judiciary Committee specifically
rejected a proposed amendment that would make the Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory,
citing the "poor record of states ... which have experimented with 'voluntary' guidelines.").
51 The vote in the House was splintered on whether to keep the Guidelines mandatory, but
the Senate was nearly unanimous, voting eighty-five to three in favor of making the Guidelines
binding. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 294 (Stevens, 1., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
130 CONGo REC. 1649 (1984».
52 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 294 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting part) (citing 130
CONGo REc. 29730 (1984».
53 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999); Apprendi V. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466 (2000); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
54 See Jones, 526 U.S. at 229.
55 See, e.g., Blakely, 542 U.S. at 325 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
56 See Jones, 526 U.S. at 229.
57 18 U.S.C.A. § 2119 (West 2007).
58 18 U.S.c.A. § 2119(2), (3) (West 2007).
59 See United States V. Jones, 526 U.S. 227, 231-232 (1999). The Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits had specifically interpreted the statute in such a way and no other circuit had reached the
opposite interpretation. See United States v. Oliver. 60 F.3d 547, 551-554 (9th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Williams, 51 F.3d 1004, 1009-1010 (II th Cir. 1995).
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Court determined that this is not a sentencing factor; rather, the statute
establishes three distinct crimes. 6o The ftrst crime is a carjacking with no
serious injury,61 the second is a carjacking resulting in serious bodily
injury,62 and the third is a carjacking resulting in death. 63
Justices Stevens and Scalia each filed a concurring opinion. 64 Both
argued that it is "unconstitutional to remove from the jury the assessment
of facts that alter the congressionally prescribed range of penalties.,,65
The majority avoided the issue of declaring sentencing factors per se
unconstitutional by determining that the carjacking statute established
three separate crimes rather than one crime with two sentencing factors. 66
While the Court's opinion does not actually stand for the proposition that
a trial court cannot use sentencing enhancements,67 the two concurring
opinions laid the groundwork for the line of cases that would ultimately
result in the Booker decision. 68
2.

Apprendi v. New Jersey

In Apprendi v. New Jersey,69 the Court examined New Jersey's
hate-crime statute. 70 On December 22, 2004, Charles Apprendi fired
several shots into the home of an African-American family that had just
moved into a previously all-white neighborhood. 71 The grand jury
returned a twenty-three-count indictment. 72 In a plea deal, Apprendi
pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of a ftrearm for an unlawful
purpose (counts three and eighteen) and one count of possession of an

60 Jones,

526 U.S. at 229.
18 U.S.C.A. § 2119(1) (West 2007).
62 18 U.S.C.A. § 2119(2) (West 2007).
63 18 U.S.C.A. § 2119(3) (West 2007).
64 Jones, 526 U.S. at 252 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also id. at 253 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(arguing that judicial factfinding that increases a defendant's sentence violates the Sixth Amendment
right to trial by jury).
65 United States v. Jones, 526 U.S. 227,253 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring).
66 [d. at 243 n.6. The Court stated that, consistent with its practice, if a statute is capable of
two interpretations, one of which raises constitutional questions and the other does not, the Court
will choose the latter interpretation. [d.
67 [d. at 239. The Court avoided the issue of sentencing enhancements in order to avoid
making a constitutional decision. See also id. at 243 n.6 (noting the majority's constitutional
concern, but simultaneously avoiding the question).
68 See id. at 253 (Scalia, J., concurring).
69 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 469 (2000).
70 See id. See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 1999-2000).
71 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469.
61

72

[d.
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anti-personnel bomb for an unlawful purpose (count twenty-two).73 The
prosecution dismissed the remaining twenty counts. 74 Counts three and
eighteen each carried a possible sentence of five to ten years'
imprisonment and count twenty-two carried a maximum sentence of
three to five years' imprisonment. 75 The prosecution reserved the right
to seek an enhancement based on New Jersey's hate-crime law as to
count eighteen,76 and Apprendi reserved the right to challenge the
constitutionality of the hate-crime enhancement. 77 The trial court then
found, based on Apprendi's comments to the police, that he had acted to
intimidate a group based upon their race. 78 This additional finding
established Apprendi's eligibility for a hate-crime enhancement. 79 This
determination was made by the judge under a preponderance-of-theevidence standard. 80
A five-justice majoritl 1 of the Supreme Court held that the
Constitution requires any fact, other than prior conviction, that expands
the sentence beyond the statutory maximum, be decided by the jury using
a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. 82 The same five justices in the
Apprendi majority would later decide Blakely and Booker. 83 Apprendi
signaled where the Court was headed with regard to sentencing factors
and would be a basis for the following decisions. 84
3.

Ring v. Arizona

The Court continued the trend of disfavoring so-called sentencing

73 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-4(a) (West 1995) (possession of a gun for an unlawful purpose);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(3) (West 1995) (possession of an anti-personnel bomb); Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 469-470.
74 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,469 (2000).

75

[d.

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e). See also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470.
78 [d.
76
77

See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e).
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 469 (2000).
81 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468.
The five justices were Justices Stevens, Scalia, Thomas,
Souter and Ginsburg.
82 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
83 See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 297 (2004); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220,225 (2005) (Stevens, J., for the Court in part).
84 See generally Berman Douglas, Appraising and Appreciating Apprendi, 12 FED.
SENTENCING REp. 303 (1999-2000). See also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 523 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(noting that the case would have far-reaching implications and would flood the lower courts with
further litigation).
79

80
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factors that expanded the sentence in Ring v. Arizona. 85 Arizona's
sentencing scheme provided that if the jury convicted the defendant of
fIrst-degree murder, then the judge had the responsibility of finding the
existence or non-existence of certain aggravating factors. 86
Timothy Ring was involved in a robbery with two other men. 87 One
person died and Ring was charged with premeditated murder and felony
murder. 88 The jury found Ring guilty of felony murder rather than
premeditated first-degree murder. 89 The trial judge then found that Ring
was a major participant in the robbery and that he was the actual killer. 90
Based on these fIndings, the trial judge sentenced Ring to death. 91
The Supreme Court of Arizona took Ring's case on automatic direct
appeal. 92 While acknowledging that Jones and Apprendi cast some doubt
on the state's capital system, the state court nonetheless held that the
sentencing scheme was constitutiona1. 93 Ring ftled a petition for
certiorari, which was granted. 94 The United States Supreme Court held
that it was unconstitutional for the judge, rather than the jury, to fInd the
aggravating factors. 95 The Court pointed out that without the finding of
an aggravating factor, Ring would not have been eligible for the death
penalty.96 As a result, the maximum penalty for which Ring was eligible
based on the jury verdict alone was life without the possibility of
parole. 97 Arizona law specifIcally provided that the judge alone should
determine the existence of aggravating factors and that the judge could
only sentence the defendant to death if the judge found at least one
aggravating factor and no mitigating factor suffIcient to justify

See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588 (2002).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(C) (West Supp. 2001) (The statute in question was
amended in 2002 to remove the reference to the judge holding the hearing. See ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-703(C) (West 2007).
87 Ring, 536 U.S. at 590-59\.
88 ld .
85

86

89 ld. The jury deadlocked on the premeditated murder charge, with six jurors voting to
acquit. ld.
90 ld. at 594.
91 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584,594 (2002).
92 See State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1142 (Ariz. 2001).
93 ld. at 1150-52.
94 See Ring v. Arizona, 534 U.S. 1103 (2002) (order granting certiorari).
95 Ring, 536 U.S. at 609. Justice Breyer wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. [d. at
613. In it he argued that sentencing enhancements are constitutional but that only a jury can
sentence a defendant to death. [d. at 614. No other justice joined in his opinion, and Justice Scalia
filed a concurring opinion in which he specifically rejected Justice Breyer's position. ld. at 612.
96 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 597 (2002).
97 [d. at 592.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2007

9

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 7

618

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

leniency.98
The Court earlier had ruled that Arizona's sentencing scheme was
constitutional. 99 However, the Court stated that the earlier decision was
incompatible with Apprendi and could not stand. loo In a concurring
opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, made the Court's
position clear.101 He stated that the "guarantee of the Sixth Amendment
is that all facts essential to imposition of the level of punishment that the
defendant receives-whether the statute calls them elements of the
offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane-must be found by the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt." 102

4.

Blakely v. Washington

The Court made clear in Blakely v. Washington that determinate
sentencing schemes had the same constitutional defects as those found in
Apprendi and Ring. 103 In 1998, Ralph Blakely kidnapped his estranged
wife and son. 104 The State of Washington initially charged him with
kidnapping in the first degree. 105 Blakely eventually pled guilty to
second-degree kidnapping involving domestic violence and the use of a
fIrearm. 106 Under the facts admitted in his plea alone, the maximum
sentence available was fifty-three months. I07 Despite this, the trial court
sentenced him to ninety months because the court found that he acted
with "deliberate cruelty.,,108
Following the trend that began in Apprendi and continued in Ring,
the Court, in another five-to-four decision, held that the statutory
maximum for a sentence is the highest sentence that a defendant could
receive based upon the jury verdict or facts admitted at a sentencing
hearing alone. I09 The State of Washington argued that there was no

See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(C) (West Supp. 2001)
See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
100 See Ring, 536 U.S. at 589.
101 See Ring, 536 U.S. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
102 Ring v. Arizona; 536 U.S. 584, 610 (2002)
103 See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004).
I~ [d. at 298.
105 WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.40.020(1) (2000).
106 See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299. See also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9AAO.030(1) (2000)
(second degree kidnapping); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 1O.99.020(3)(p) (2000) (defining crimes
involving domestic violence); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.125 (2000) (use of a firearm in the
commission of a crime).
107 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299.
lOS /d. at 299-300.
109 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004).
98

99
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Apprendi violation because the statutory maximum was not the fiftythree months but rather the ten-year maximum for class B felonies. 11O In
rejecting this argument, the Court stated specifically that the statutory
maximum was the highest sentence "the judge may impose solely on the
basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant. "III
The dissenters, led by Justice O'Connor, complained that this
sentencing scheme was indistinguishable from the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines (which had not been ruled unconstitutional) and that there
was a distinct difference between sentencing factors and elements of the
crime. 112 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, responded to the
criticism by stating that there was no decision being made with regard to
the Sentencing Guidelines. ll3 He went further to argue that under the
system advocated by the dissenters, it would be perfectly constitutional
to convict someone of illegal possession of a firearm but receive a
sentence for killing someone. 114 Justice O'Connor argued that Justice
Scalia was taking his argument to the extreme and that there was a builtin political check to prevent this.115 However, she did not elaborate on
what that political check might be. 116
C.

BOOKER MAKES IT OFFICIAL

Following Blakely, several courts were unsure whether the
Guidelines were actually implicated. ll7 Some courts were following the
Guidelines, but only insofar as the facts of a guilty plea or a jury finding
dictated. I 18 At least one court declared the Guidelines in their entirety

110 [d.
III

at 303.

[d. (emphasis in original).

112 [d. at 325 (O'Connor J., dissenting). See also Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondent, Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (No. 02-1632) 2004 WL
177025 at *1 (arguing that "[aJlthough the Washington sentencing guidelines system differs in
significant respects from the United States Sentencing Guidelines, a decision invalidating judicial
departure authority here could call into question the constitutionality of the federal Guidelines").
113 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305 n.9.
114 [d. at 306.
115 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 307 n.IO (2004) (commenting on Justice
O'Connor's dissent).
116 [d. (commenting on Justice O'Connor's dissent).
117 See, e.g., Fanfan v. United States, No. 03-47, 2004 WL 1723114, at *5 (D. Me. June 28,
2004).
118 See Fanfan v. United States, No. 03-47, 2004 WL 1723114, at *5 (D. Me. June 28, 2004);
United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 510 (7th Cir. 2004). In Fanfan, the judge relied not only on
the majority opinion in Blakely but also on the opinions of the dissenters and the Solicitor General's
amicus brief. Fanfan, 2004 WL 1723114, at *5.
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unconstitutional. 119 These courts were not making any judicial findings
of fact whatsoever. 120 Given the upheaval in the state of the law and the
need to have the issue clarified, the Senate unanimously passed a
resolution asking the Supreme Court to declare whether the Guidelines
were constitutional. 121 The Court agreed to hold a special session to
determine the constitutionality of the Guidelines. 122 The Court granted
certiorari in two cases, United States v. Booker and United States v.
Fanfan.123
The Court granted certiorari on two questions: (1) whether the
Sentencing Guidelines violated a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights as
interpreted by Blakely, and (2) if the first question was answered in the
affirmative, what was the remedy.124 In an opinion authored by Justice
Stevens, and joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, Souter and Ginsburg, the
Court held that the Guidelines, as applied in these cases, violated the
defendants' Sixth Amendment rights. 125 Despite the fact that the Blakely
Court had stated that the Guidelines were not at risk of being declared
unconstitutional,126 the Court found that they were indistinguishable from
the sentencing scheme that the State of Washington employed. 127 In a
separate opinion for the Court, authored by Justice Breyer, and joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Ginsburg,
the Court held that congressional intent dictated that the Guidelines be
made advisory. 128 Thus, the Guidelines were not entirely eliminated. 129

United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967,970 (9th Cir. 2004) [Ameline 1].
See, e.g., Fanfan v. United States, No. 03-47, 2004 WL 1723114, at *5 (D. Me. June 28,
2004). Instead of making judicial findings of fact, these courts were basing the sentence solely on
what was found by the jury or what was admitted in the guilty plea. See id.
121 S. Con. Res. 130, 108th Congo (2004); 150 CONGo REC. S8572 - S8574. The Senate
Judiciary Committee also held a series of hearings in which testimony was presented regarding the
state of the law.
The transcripts of these hearings can be accessed at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1260 (last visited Mar. 27, 2007).
122 See United States v. Booker, 542 U.S. 956 (2004); United States v. Fanfan, 542 U.S. 956
(2004) (order granting certiorari and setting an expedited briefing schedule).
123 See United States V. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 542 U.S. 956
(2004); Fanfan v. United States, 2004 WL 1723114 (D. Me. 2004), cen. granted before judgment,
542 U.S. 956 (2004).
124 United States V. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 229 n.l (2005) (Stevens, J., for the Court in part).
125 [d. at 225-227 (Stevens, J. for the Court in part). The Court announced a joint decision for
United States v. Booker and United States V. Fanfan as a single opinion under the heading United
States v. Booker. [d. at 220. All references to Booker necessarily also encompass the Fanfan
decision.
126 See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296,305 n.9 (2004).
127 Booker, 543 U.S. at 230 (Stevens, J., for the Court in part). Ironically, the Court partially
relied on Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Blakely. [d.
128 [d. at 244-246 (Breyer, J., for the Court in part). Justice Breyer's opinion is referred to as
the "remedial" opinion because it deals with the remedy to be applied after the Court declared the
119

120
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In total, five opinions were issued, accumulating over 100 pages. 130
The remedial opinion specifically stated that the decision would
apply to all cases on direct review at the time of the decision. 131 The
Court further stated that not all cases would require a remand and a new
sentencing hearing.132 What the court declined to do, however, was
instruct the lower courts regarding exactly which sentences would
require a new hearing and which would not. 133 The Court simply
referred to "ordinary prudential concerns."I34
II.

THE "PLAIN-ERROR PROBLEM"

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) provides defendants an
opportunity to challenge errors that were not preserved at trial. 135 Also
known as the plain-error standard of review, Rule 52(b) gives courts the
opportunity to correct particularly egregious errors that were not objected
to at trial. 136 In order to show plain error that is reversible, an appellant
must show the following: (1) that there was error; (2) that the error was
plain; (3) that the error affected substantial rights; and (4) that the error
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings. 137
The typical plain-error case places the burden of showing prejudice
on the appellant. 138 In United States v. Olano, the Court held that while
this is usually the case, there were two types of errors that were
exceptions to this rule. 139 The two categories of exceptions the Court
listed were "a special category of forfeited errors" and a class of "errors
that should be presumed prejudicial."l40 However, the Court specifically
mandatory Guidelines unconstitutional. Id.
129 Id. Justice Breyer was actually involved in drafting the SRA. He was counsel to the
Senate Judiciary Committee and was one of the first commissioners on the Sentencing Commission.
See Michael O'Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U. CIN. L. REv.
749,778 (2006)
130 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,220-334 (2005).
131 See id. at 268 (Breyer, J .• for the Court in part).
132
Id.
133 See Jenkins. supra note 6. at 821.
134 Booker. 543 U.S. at 268 (Breyer. J .• for the Court in part).
135 FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
136 Id. If a defendant does not object to an error at trial. then that objection is normally
considered forfeited. See United States v. Olano. 507 U.S. 725. 734 (1993). The plain-error rule
allows a defendant to avoid this harsh result in certain cases. Id.
137 See Johnson v. United States. 520 U.S. 461. 467 (1997).
138 See Olano. 507 U.S. at 734.
139 Id. at 735.
140 Id.
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declined to elaborate on what it meant by either of these categories. 141
The clear implication is that there will be some cases in which the
traditional burden does not apply to the defendant but rather to the
government. 142 The first type of Olano exception has been referred to as
a "structural error" and is defined as a "defect affecting the framework
within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial
process itself.,,143 There is a strong presumption that no structural error
has occurred when there has been an impartial adjudicator and a
competent lawyer to represent the defendant. 144 Because of this, claims
of structural error rarely succeed. 145 While a claim that Booker error is
structural is unlikely to succeed, the fact that there are exceptions
provided a starting point for some circuits. 146
Most of the circuits have found that Booker error comes not from
judicial factfinding, but rather when the extra-verdict findings are made
in a mandatory guideline system. 147 Consequently, anyone sentenced
under the belief that the Sentencing Guidelines were mandatory has
satisfied the first prong of the test to establish reversible plain error. 148
The second prong is similarly easy to satisfy, because an error is plain if
it is "contrary to the law at the time of appeal .... ,,149 Any case that was
on direct appeal at the time that Booker was announced would satisfy this
prong. 150
The problem arises with the third prong. 15l If the defendant's
sentence would have been the same under the advisory scheme, then no

Id.
See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735 (1993).
143 See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1986).
144 See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1,8 (1999).
145 No circuit has referred to Booker error as structural.
However, Judge Tjoflat of the
Eleventh Circuit argued in dissent that Booker error is structural. See United States v. Rodriguez,
406 F.3d 1261, 1282 (11th Cir. 2005) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
146 See Deborah Nail, United States v. Booker: The Presumption of Prejudice in Plain Error
Review, 81 CHI-KENT LAW REVIEW 621, 635 (2006).
147 See, e.g., United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68, 75 (1st Cir. 2005); United States
v. Williams, 399 F.3d 450, 458 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 518 (5th Cir.
2005); United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471,482-83 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Pirani, 406
F.3d 543, 550 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc); United States v. Lawrence, 405 F.3d 888, 906 (lOth Cir.
2005); United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1300 (lIth Cir. 2005); United States v. Smith,
401 F.3d 497,499 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
148 See Rodriguez, 406 F.3d at 1262 (Carnes, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en
bane).
149 See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461,468 (1997).
150 See Rodriguez, 406 F.3d at 1262 (Carnes, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en
bane).
151 See United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2005) [Ameline ill].
141

142
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substantial rights have been affected. 152 In most circumstances it will be
impossible to tell whether the sentence would have been the same. 153 As
the majority in Ameline explained, "the record in very few cases will
provide a reliable answer to the question of whether the judge would
have imposed a different sentence had the Guidelines been viewed as
advisory.,,154 Most of the circuits assume that if the third prong is met,
then the fourth prong is automatically met as well. 155
III. THE CIRCUITS' VARIOUS RESPONSES

In light of Booker, there has emerged a four-way circuit split
regarding how to approach the "Plain-Error Problem.,,156 The approach
used by a particular defendant's circuit is one of the key factors in
determining whether the defendant will receive a new sentencing
hearing. 157 This has created a disparity similar to the disparities that
Congress attempted to avoid in creating the Sentencing Guidelines. 158 It
is a disparity that the Supreme Court has so far declined to address. 159
A.

THE "HARD-LINE" APPROACH

Several circuits have held that traditional plain-error review should
apply.l60 The position of these courts is that if the appellate panel cannot
determine whether the error was prejudicial, then the defendant has not
met his or her burden and is not entitled to any form of relief. 161 Under
See id.
See id.
154 Id. at 1079.
155 See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 406 F.3d 1261, 1265-66 (10th Cir. 2005) (Carnes, J.,
concurring in the denial of rehearing en bane). The one exception to this is the Tenth Circuit, which
is discussed infra. See infra notes 168-174 and accompanying text.
156 See Jenkins, supra note 6, at 815.
157 See id.
158 See id.
159 See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 545 U.S. 1127 (2005) (denying certiorari in one of
the cases that has raised the issue and in which the Solicitor General recommended that review be
granted).
160 The Circuits that have decided the traditional rule should be applied are the First, Fifth,
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits. See United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2005) (en bane)
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 266 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2005) (No. 05-5547); United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d
511,522 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied 126 S. Ct. 43 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2005) (No. 04-9517); United States
v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68, 78-79 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291,
1300 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1127.
161 See Pirani, 406 F.3d at 543; Mares, 402 F.3d at 522; Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d at 78-79;
Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 130. Circuit Judges Wardlaw, Gould, O'Scannlain, and Bea argued in
dissent that the Ninth Circuit should adopt the traditional form of plain error as well. Ameline III,
152
153
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this approach, the inquiry shifts from whether the sentence would have
been substantially different to whether the defendant can prove that it
would have been substantially different. 162
B.

THE PRESUMPTION-OF-PREJUDICE APPROACH

Other circuits have taken the opposite approach. 163 These circuits
have held that whenever a defendant's sentence was enhanced based on
facts neither admitted nor found by the jury, the defendant has shown
prejudice. l64 Under this approach, the appellate panel compares the
sentence that the defendant could have received based solely on the
jury's verdict or facts admitted by the defendant, with the sentence that
he actually received. 165 If the former would have been more favorable to
the defendant, then the defendant has shown prejudice. l66 These circuits
implicitly reject the finding, made by the Ninth Circuit and others, that
judicial factfinding is "erroneous only when coupled with a mandatory
guidelines system.,,167
C.

THE SO-CALLED "COMPROMISE" APPROACH

The Tenth Circuit has taken an approach that one writer
characterized as a compromise. 168 Under the Tenth Circuit's approach,
the emphasis is placed on the fourth prong of the plain-error standard of
review. 169
In the en banc decision that adopted the "compromise" position,"
the majority did not even seek to answer the third prong. 170 Instead, the
court took judicial notice of the fact that the defendant had his sentence

409 F.3d at 1087.
162 See Nail, supra note 146, at 635.
163 The Circuits that have explicitly adopted the presumption-of-prejudice approach are the
Fourth and Sixth Circuits. See United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2005); United States
v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 2005). The Third Circuit, while consistently remanding for new
sentencing, has actually refused to articulate a standard. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 407 F.3d
162 (3d Cir. 2005). Even though the Third Circuit refuses to articulate a standard, its practices show
that the court is presuming prejudice. See Jenkins, supra note 6, at 830.
164 See Davis, 407 F.3d at 162; Hughes, 401 F.3d at 548; Oliver, 397 F.3d at 369.
165 See, e.g., Hughes, 401 F.3d at 548.
166 [d.
United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1081 (9th Cir 2005) (en banc) [Ameline IIIJ.
See Jenkins, supra note 6, at 815 (characterizing the Tenth Circuit's approach in United
States v. Gonzales-Huerta as a "compromise"); see also United States v. Gonzales-Huerta, 403 F.3d
727,736 (10th Cir. 2005) (en bane).
169 See United States v. Gonzales-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 736 (10th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
170 See Jenkins, supra note 6, at 815; see also Gonzales-Huena, 403 F.3d at 736.
167

168
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enhanced based only on a prior conviction. 171 In addition, his sentence
was on the low end of the scale of what he could have received. 172 The
court assumed that the third prong of the plain-error test was met and
proceeded to analyze the fourth prong.173 Under the compromise
approach, the burden of showing that the error affected the integrity of
the proceedings is on the defendant. 174
D.

THE "LIMITED-REMAND" APPROACH

In United States v. Ameline, the Ninth Circuit considered what the
appropriate procedure would be for individuals sentenced under the
mandatory system but who failed to challenge the sentence at the time of
sentencing. 175 The court acknowledged that different circuits have taken
different paths and stated that it benefited from discussions by the other
circuits. 176 The court chose to join the Second, Seventh, and D.C.
Circuits in creating a "limited-remand" procedure. 177
The Ninth Circuit's limited-remand procedure established a new
version of the plain-error standard of review. 178 The new procedure
requires the appellate panel to remand the case to the district court for the
sole purpose of asking the lower court whether the sentence would have
been different under the new post-Booker advisory guidelines. 179 The
court relied on 18 U.S.c. § 3742(f), which grants the court of appeals the
authority to remand a case solely for the purpose of resentencing. 180 The
court reasoned that "the power to remand for resentencing necessarily
encompasses the lesser power to order a limited remand." 181
In section IV of the Ameline opinion, the majority clearly articulated
the exact process. 182 First, when faced with unpreserved Booker error,
the court must determine whether the defendant wants to pursue the
error. 183 If the defendant does choose to pursue the error, then the panel

171

Gonzales-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 738-39.

172

[d.

[d. at 736.
See Jenkins, supra note 6, at 826.
175 United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1074 (9th Cir. 2005) (en bane) [Ameline IIIJ.

173
174

176

[d.

177

178

[d. at 1079.
See id.

179

[d.

180

[d.

181 United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1079 (9th Cir. 2005) (en bane) [Ameline IIIJ
(summarizing United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 117 (2d CiT. 2005».
182 Ameline III, 409 F.3d at 1084.
183 [d.
This will be accomplished by asking defendant's counsel to brief whether the

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2007

17

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 7

626

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

must search the record to determine if it is clear whether the sentence
would have been different under the new advisory scheme. l84 In most
cases, it will be unclear from the record. 185 If the panel reaches such a
dead end, it will order a limited remand. 186
For the limited remand, the question posed to the district court is
simply whether the sentence imposed would have been materially
different. 187 If it would not have been materially different, then the
district court should so indicate on the record. ISS If the sentence would
have been different, then the error was prejudicial. 189 Failing to correct a
prejudicial error affects the integrity, fairness and public reputation of the
court. 190 Thus, to correct this error, the district court must vacate the
original sentence and resentence the defendant. 191
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S IMPERFECT APPROACH IS THE BEST OPTION

The typical plain-error case places the burden of showing prejudice
on the defendant. 192 This is the approach taken by the "hard-line"
circuits. 193 The fatal flaw in this approach is that in essentially every
case, it will be impossible to make such a showing. 194 As the majority in
Ameline pointed out, the trial judge had no reason to make a record from

defendant wants to pursue the error. [d.
184 [d.
185 [d.
186 !d. In those rare instances in which the panel finds that the record is clear enough to make
a determination that the sentencing judge would have sentenced the defendant to a more lenient
sentence, the panel will order a full remand with a new sentencing hearing, rather than the limited
remand. See United States v. Perez, 475 F.3d 1110, 1111 (9th Cir. 2007).
187 United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1084 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) [Ameline ill].
188 1d. at 1085.

189 [d.
190 [d.

191 [d. The Seventh and D.C. Circuits' approach is slightly different. See United States v.
Coles, 403 F.3d 764, 770 (D.C. Cir. 2005); United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2005).
Rather than have the district court immediately resentence the defendant, the district court must
answer the question in the affirmative and send the case back to the court of appeals. See Paladino,
401 F.3d at 484 Coles, 403 F.3d at 770. Once the appellate court receives the case, the panel must
vacate the sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing. See Coles, 403 F.3d at 770;
Paladino, 40 I F.3d at 484. This procedure is similar in substance but is unnecessarily convoluted.
See Coles, 403 F.3d at 770; Paladino, 401 F.3d at 484.
192 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
193 See, e.g., United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68, 78 (1st Cir. 2005)
194 See United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1081 (9th Cir. 2005) (en bane) [Ameline ill]
(quoting Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit in Paladino, 401 F.3d at 484, who stated that placing
the burden of showing prejudice on the defendant presents the defendant with an "impossible
burden") (emphasis in original».
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which the defendant can show prejudice. 19s Occasionally, a judge might
have used the record to express disapproval of mandatory guidelines. 196
However, this was extremely rare because judges realized that this was a
fruitless action. 197 The sentence was mandatory under the Guidelines
whether or not the judge approved. 198 This gave the court little incentive
to express its disapproval with the mandatory Guidelines. l99 Forcing the
defendant to make a showing of prejudice is, in many cases, forcing the
defendant to make an impossible showing. 2OO Judge Posner of the
Seventh Circuit criticized the hard-line approach by saying that "we
cannot fathom why the Eleventh Circuit wants to condemn some
unknown fraction of criminal defendants to serve an illegal sentence.,,201
On the other hand, the circuits that presume prejudice ignore plainerror review and create a system that is inefficient and wastes judicial
resources. 202 To establish plain error, a defendant must make some
showing of prejudice. 203 While it is inappropriate to force a defendant to
make that showing in the traditional manner, it is also inappropriate to
shift the burden on that question to the government.204 In addition,
sentencing hearings are lengthy.20s A judge must examine all evidence
that is part of the presentence report and hear any additional evidence
that a defendant may present. 206 If the sentence is going to be
substantially the same, the result is a colossal waste of judicial resources.
Even worse, the circuits that follow the presumption of prejudice
approach ignore the one clear piece of guidance that the Supreme Court

See Ameline 1II, 409 F.3d at 1084.
See id. Other judges, such as Senior District Judge Thelton Henderson, complain about
the Sentencing Guidelines in general. Judge Henderson has specifically complained about the high
mandatory minimums on drug crimes. Interview with Thelton Henderson, Senior District Judge,
of
California
(Winter,
1997 -1998),
available
at
Northern
District
http://www.pbs.orglwgbh/pageS/frontline/shows/dope/interviews/judge.html (last visited Mar. 27,
2007).
197 See id. In Judge Henderson's interview, he stated that there was nothing a district judge
could do other than give the sentence dictated by the Guidelines. ld.
198 18 U.S.C.A. 3553(b)(l) (West 2007).
199 See Judge Henderson Interview, supra note 196.
200 See United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 484 (7th Cir. 2005).
2Ol
ld.
202 See, e.g., Judge Michael McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 665, 667
(2006).
203 FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
204 But see Nail, supra note 146, at 621 (reaching the opposite conclusion).
205 See McConnell, supra note 202, at 667. As Judge McConnell points out, a sentencing
hearing imposes high costs on the district courts, U.S. attorneys, public defenders, marshals, and
prison authorities because of the requirements of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id.
206 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i).
195

196
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did provide. 207 The Court stated that not "every appeal will lead to a new
sentencing hearing. ,,208
The so-called "compromise" approach adopted by the Tenth Circuit
is no compromise at all. 209 The court refused to address the standard
regarding the showing required to establish prejudice. 210 Instead, the
Tenth Circuit jumped straight to the fourth prong. 211 While it is
important to look at the fourth prong, placing the burden on the
defendant imposes just as difficult a task as showing prejudice. 212 The
only way truly to show that the integrity of the court has been questioned
is to show that the defendant received an illegal sentence. 213 If this
showing is made, then the defendant has met the third prong. 214 In
essence, the so-called "compromise" is nothing more than taking the
hard-line approach. 215
For example, Judge Michael McConnell
examined the difficulty for a defendant to make a showing that would
satisfy the Tenth Circuit's approach. 216 According to Judge McConnell,
as of 2006, only seven percent of defendants who challenged a
mandatory application of the Guidelines using plain-error review had
their sentences vacated and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. 217
Of these cases, every defendant received a new sentence and over half
had their sentences reduced by more than forty percent. 218 Yet the
question remains how many more sentences would have been different
had they not failed to meet the Tenth Circuit's difficult standard.
The limited-remand approach resolves the problems presented by
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,268 (2005) (Breyer, J., for the Court in part).
ld.
209 See Jenkins, supra note 6, at 841. Even Jenkins, who argued that the Tenth Circuit's
approach is a compromise, argued that it was inappropriate to place the burden of showing prejudice
on the defendant. Id.
210 The court was split on this issue of what showing was required to establish prejudice even
more than the issue of what was required under the fourth prong. See generally United States v.
Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 742 (10th Cir.2005) (Ebel, J., concurring). One judge who felt that
the defendant failed the fourth prong actually sided with the dissenters regarding whether GonzalezHuerta had established prejudice. See id. (Ebel, J., concurring).
211 See Jenkins, supra note 6, at 826.
212 See id. at 842. The only way to show that an action casts doubt on the integrity of the
proceedings will be to show that the sentence would ha ve been different. Id. In practice, the
"compromise" approach will play out exactly like the hard-line approach. [d.
213 If the defendant did not receive an illegal sentence, then the sentence is legal. If the
sentence is legal, then clearly the integrity of the court is not called into question.
214 See, e.g., United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68, 78-79 (I st Cir. 2005).
215 See Jenkins, supra note 6, at 815 (defending the notion of focusing on the fourth prong but
criticizing the Tenth Circuit for placing the burden on the defendant).
216 See McConnell, supra note 202, at 669.
217
/d.
218 1d. at 672.
207

208

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol37/iss3/7

20

Guasco: Limited Remand in Sentencing Hearings

2007] LIMITED REMAND IN SENTENCING REHEARINGS

629

the other three options.219 This approach allows the defendant a chance
at making a showing of prejudice without inappropriately shifting the
burden to the government. 220 Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit
described the limited-remand approach as follows:
It is the middle way between placing on the defendant the impossible
burden of proving that the sentencing judge would have imposed a
different sentence had the judge not thought the guidelines were
mandatory and requiring that all defendants whose cases were pending
when Booker was decided are entitled to be resentenced, even when it
is clear that the judge would impose the same sentence and the court
of appeals would affirm.221

This approach is certainly not perfect. 222 As the dissent in Ameline
pointed out, this approach ignores the traditional plain-error standard of
review. 223 By allowing a limited remand, the court lessens the burden on
the defendant. 224 In addition, this approach is clearly not as efficient as
the hard-line approach.225 More judicial resources will be required under
this approach. 226 However, courts should be concerned with justice first
and judicial economy second. 227
Another problem with the limited-remand approach is the fact that
some of the sentencing judges will be unavailable. 228 Unfortunately, this
is unavoidable. However, these cases will be.fairly rare,229 and courts
should not use a rare occurrence to maintain an impossible standard of
review for everyone. 230
The Seventh Circuit pointed out that giving a defendant an illegal
sentence was just as much a miscarriage of justice as convicting an

219

See United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 484-85 (7th Cir. 2005).
United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d \073, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005) (en bane) [Ameline

220 See

IlIJ.
Paladino, 401 F.3d at 484-85.
Even the majority in Ameline acknowledged that the limited remand is not a perfect
option. See Ameline III, 409 F.3d at 1080.
223 Id. at \087 (Wardlaw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
224 Id.
221

222

225 United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d \073, 1087 (9th Cir. 2005) (en bane) [Ameline IlIJ
(Wardlaw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
226 [d.

See United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 484 (7th Cir. 2005).
See Ameline lll, 409 F.3d at \087 (Wardlaw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
229 See Ameline III,409 F.3d at 1082.
230 See United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d \073, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) [Ameline
227

228

IIIJ.
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innocent person. 231 The purpose of plain-error review is to avoid
miscarriages of justice because they cast doubt on the integrity of the
court. 232 Appellate courts should seek to avoid these injustices whenever
possible. 233 In the case of post-Booker error, the limited-remand
approach is neither the most efficient nor the easiest on the defendant. 234
However, with these two competing considerations in mind, it is
definitely the best approach. 235
However, proper use of judicial resources is an issue of serious
concern. 236 Federal courts are overburdened. 237 Several of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure have preserving judicial economy as a goal. 238
For this reason, the court should have imposed a higher burden on the
defendant. 239 Under the current limited-remand approach, all a defendant
has to show is that it is unclear whether the sentencing judge would have
imposed a different sentence. 24O It is hard to imagine a case that does not
meet this burden.241 Further, a subsequent opinion explaining Ameline
stated that the district court was required to consider, or at least solicit,
the written views of counsel before answering the limited-remand
question. 242 Unfortunately, this wastes precious resources in cases in
which there is no question that the sentence would have been the same. 243
Paladino, 401 F.3d at 483.
FED. R. CRIM .P. 52(b).
233 See, e.g., United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 483 (7th Cir. 2005).
234 See Ameline III, 409 F.3d at 1087 (Wardlaw, 1., concuning in part and dissenting in part).
235 It is important to note that of the four approaches, the limited-remand and the hard-line
approaches have attracted the most circuits, with four each. See United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d
543 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc); United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir.
2005) (adopting hard-line approach); see also United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir.
2005) (en banc) [Ameline III]; United States v. Coles, 403 F.3d 764 (D.C. Cir. 2005); United States
v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005)
(adopting limited remand).
236 See Ameline 1/1, 409 F.3d at 1087 (Wardlaw, 1., concuning in part and dissenting in part).
237 See id.
238 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(g),(h)(I) (providing that certain defenses are waived if not
consolidated with other defenses raised by motion).
239 But see Nail, supra note 146, at 641 (arguing that there should be no burden on the
defendant whatsoever).
240 Ameline 1/1, 409 F.3d at 1074.
241 United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1086 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Wardlaw, J.,
concuning in part and dissenting in part) [Ameline III].
242 See United States v. Montgomery, 462 F.3d 1067, 1068 (9th Cir. 2006). While the Ninth
Circuit has held that the sentencing judge must consider written materials that a defendant may want
to offer, a recent case determined that the judge does not have to allow a defendant to allocute in
person, especially when that defendant had the opportunity to do so at the first sentencing hearing
but refused to do so. See United States v. Silva, 472 F.3d 683,689 (9th Cir. 2007).
243 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 202, at 665.
231
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For this reason, the Ameline court should have imposed some burden on
the defendant to show a reasonable probability that his or her sentence
would have been different. 244 This burden may be low, but it would help
to weed out those cases in which there is no chance that the defendant
will receive a new sentence. 245 Yet because this burden should be highly
fact-specific, it would be hard to articulate. 246 Some examples of ways in
which a defendant might meet this burden include the following:
showing that there was evidence that could not be considered by the
district court under the mandatory Guidelines, or showing that the
defendant's sentence was on the low end of what the judge could have
given.

v.

CONCLUSION

The circuits that automatically remand all cases with Booker error
ignore the clear instruction from the Supreme Court that not all cases are
entitled to a new sentencing hearing. 247 These circuits also rely on the
presumption of prejudice, which the Supreme Court mentioned in
Olano 248 but which the Court has never actually applied. 249 On the other
hand, the circuits that follow the hard-line approach impose a nearly
impossible burden on defendants. 25o Likewise, the Tenth Circuit's
"compromise" is really no compromise and essentially imposes the same
impossible burden on defendants as under the hard-line approach. 25t The
limited-remand approach resolves these two conflicting interests in the

244 But see Nail, supra note 146, at 641 (arguing that there should be no burden on the
defendant whatsoever).
245 This would allow the burden to remain where it should be, on the defendant, rather than
shifting the burden of negating prejudice to the government.
246 The best way of wording it is to say that the defendant has shown that it is reasonably
possible that the district court would have imposed a different sentence under an advisory Guideline
system.
247 See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
248 See generally United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
249 See McConnell, supra note 202, at 665.
250 See supra notes 200-201 and accompanying text.
251 See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
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best way possible. 252 Moreover, by imposing a slightly higher burden on
the defendant to show a reasonable probability that his or her sentence
would have been different, the Ninth Circuit could have crafted an
approach that is both sound and that reduces the load placed on district
courts.
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